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1. Introduction 
The value of sell-side research, its impact on stock-prices, and financial analysts’ role as information 
intermediaries has been researched thoroughly (e.g., Womack (1996); Barber, Lehavy, Trueman 
(2007); Loh and Stulz (2011); Bradley, Clarke, Lee, Chayawat (2014)). A central shortcoming in the 
associated literature however is that the implications of macroeconomic conditions are mostly 
dismissed, although some studies on the implications of bad times have been conducted in the US 
(e.g., Kretzmann, Maaz, Pucker (2015); Loh and Stultz (2018)). The lack of research focus on the 
implications of bad times is unjustified in terms of macro uncertainty creating greater variation in 
firm outcomes (e.g., Bloom (2009)) and more ambiguity in firm value for investors (Zhang (2006)).  
 
Bad times are also known to make it more difficult for analysts to assess implications of the 
underlying economic conditions, apparent in larger earnings forecast errors in bad times (e.g., Hope 
and Kang (2005)). Despite the pronounced implications of bad times to the information environment 
and analyst output, little research is conducted on the impact on value over various macroeconomic 
times and markets. Hence, the question remains whether increases in macroeconomic uncertainty 
increases the value of analyst output in Finland or not.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether sell-side analyst output is more valuable in bad 
economic times in Finland. I contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, I study the value of 
analyst output in both good and bad times in Finland by incorporating the methodology of Loh and 
Stulz (2018). To assess value, I constitute a two-day event study on the price-impact following analyst 
recommendation changes. Next, I assess if local analysts provide more valuable output than foreign 
peers in bad times by comparing the same price-impact. As reference, Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) 
find that local analysts issue more precise earnings forecasts than foreign peers. Finally, I study if the 
perceived value-effect arises from investors’ increased reliance on analyst output by examining if the 
price-impact is larger for harder-to-value stocks, following Loh and Stulz (2018).  
 
I find weak evidence for sell-side analyst output being more valuable in bad macroeconomic times in 
Finland. Moreover, I find similarly weak evidence for local analysts issuing more valuable output 
and semi-strong evidence for the effect fluctuating in tandem with the geographical scope of bad 
times. Subsequently, I am not able to contribute differences in value to changes in investors’ needs. 
However, I find strong evidence for analyst output being more valuable in bad times using the CAPM 
as a benchmark, consistent with the findings of Loh and Stulz (2018). 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the existing literature on the 
value of sell-side analyst output and describes the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data sample 
and the methodologies used to test the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 adds the 
CAPM and the Carhart Four-Factor Model as benchmarks and controls for analyst, recommendation, 
and firm characteristics. Section 6 concludes and presents recommendations for future research.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Sources of Analyst Output Value 
Studies on the value of sell-side research in bad times have been conducted in the US (e.g., Barber et 
al. (2001); Loh and Stultz (2018)). However, these papers focus on examining the effects in the US 
and it is unclear whether these effects apply in Finland as well. Finnish financial markets differ from 
the US in many characteristics, such as liquidity, role of financial markets in the overall economy, 
dependency on foreign trade, and share of institutional ownership (e.g., Nyberg, Vaihekoski (2014); 
Haaparanta et al. (2017); Puttonen (2004)). It is thus unclear whether the effects exist in Finland and 
to what extent. 
 
Conversely, studies on the effects of analyst output have been conducted in Finland but none have 
covered the impact of macroeconomic conditions. If bad times such as recessions and crises increase 
macroeconomic uncertainty and it is the role of analysts to assess the implications of those times, 
analyst output should be more valuable. I study the value of analyst output over various bad times by 
incorporating multiple proxies for them. I use the same definitions of bad times as Loh and Stulz 
(2018) to study the effect in Finland vis-á-vis the findings from the US. 
 
I focus on bad macroeconomic times instead of firm-specific bad times because they influence the 
broad economy and are exogenous to analysts. Analysts’ ability to analyze firm’s idiosyncratic risk 
has been researched thoroughly, and for instance Frankel and Weber (2006) show that analyst output 
is more valuable when firm-level uncertainty is higher. For the measure of value, I incorporate the 
view that if analyst output has an effect on stock-prices, it changes investors’ priors and is therefore 
valuable to investors (Loh and Stulz (2018)).  
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My specific measure of the value of analyst output is a two-day Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), 
which captures the extent the new information in analyst output changes investors’ priors during a 
two-day event window. I do not explore pre-event information leakage since I am not able to reliably 
isolate the pre-event price-drift on the output. I examine the effect following recommendation 
changes, divided into upgrades and downgrades, rather than recommendation or price levels because 
absolute levels of recommendations can be biased and therefore recommendation changes are more 
reliable at assessing analyst impact (e.g., Boni and Womack (2006)).  
 
The extent new signals change investors’ priors depend on the weight investors put on the new signal 
compared to their prior signal (Pástor and Veronesi (2009)). Thus, differences in the price-impact 
over varied macroeconomic times can arise from either more valuable analyst output or changes in 
how investors value the output. Throughout the paper, I assume that analysts do not change what they 
do per se in bad times. The implication for fixed analyst behavior is that analyst output is consistent 
with regards to all external factors at all times, and that the bad time-effect occurs because investors 
value analyst output differently.  
 
It is plausible however that in bad times analysts change their behavior for example by changing how 
much they work, being differently motivated, using different skills or having conflicts of interest (Loh 
and Stulz (2018)). As an example of analyst output being more valuable, Michaely and Womack 
(1999) show that analysts face less pressure to produce optimistic research in bad times due to less 
investment banking business, which can bias the output. Kacperczyk, Veldkemp, and Van 
Niewerburgh (2013) find that fund managers do better in bad times, because they showcase better 
market-timing skills. Further, Glode (2011) presents that investors expect fund managers to fare better 
than the market more in bad times than good times. Hence, analysts might also be inclined to have 
skill in analyzing macroeconomic bad times just like fund managers.  
 
Conversely, bad times can also affect analyst output negatively. For example, Betrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) show that analysts can use the higher underlying noise in bad times to hide their 
lack of effort. Also, lesser deal flow, lower valuation levels, and trading volume in bad times can 
shrink profits for financial institutions in general and therefore decrease analyst motivation. In 
addition to shrinking profits, bad times can cause conflicts of interests within financial institutions. 
For instance, Barber et al. (2007) show that analysts in institutions with investment banking business 
are more reluctant to downgrade stocks compared to peers in independent research firms. 
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Bad economic times can also affect how investors react to new information. All else equal, if bad 
times increase the noise in investors’ priors more than in new analyst output, investors should value 
analyst output more (Loh and Stulz (2018)). The noise in analyst signals compared to investors’ priors 
can decrease in two ways. Either analysts provide signals with less noise than in investors’ priors or 
investors’ other sources of information decrease, making analysts output relatively less noisy.  
 
As evidence for higher reliance on analyst output, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) find that investors 
with more private information rely less on analysts. Thus, if the underlying market uncertainty 
increases in bad times and investors’ other signals become noisier, investors might have to rely more 
on analyst output. Also, there is evidence that investors react more to earnings news in bad times 
(Schmalz and Zhuk (2017)), and perhaps react more to all types of news in bad times. An alternative 
view by Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) suggests that in bad times more news hit the market, which 
distracts investors and leads to underreaction. 
 
Although I use the price-impact followed by recommendation changes as the de-facto proxy for value, 
it is plausible that other, investor or market-related factors affect the price-impact, thus diluting the 
observable value of the output. Under the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH), new information gets 
reflected in asset prices immediately and correctly, yet due to market imperfections exogenous to 
analyst output this may not occur. For example, investment strategies, tax-policy on capital gains and 
losses, transaction costs as well as human psychology can alter the behavior of investors and the 
price-impact over economic cycles (Chang 2011)). Moreover, the observable stock-price impact is 
not the only manner in which analysts add value. Increasing the number of analysts and competition 
in the information market yields positive externalities other than the price-impact. More competition 
increases average forecast accuracy, alleviates information asymmetries among market participants, 
and enables more efficient information dissemination (Merkley, Michaely, Pacelli (2017)).  
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
Following the methodologies of Loh and Stulz (2018), I examine whether the state of the economy 
affects stock-price impacts following analyst recommendation revisions and explore a possible 
explanation for the results. First, I develop three hypotheses that examine whether analysts provide 
more valuable output in bad times, whether the location of the analyst, and the scope of the 
macroeconomic uncertainty affects the outcome. Next, I develop an additional hypothesis that 
examines why investors might value analyst output more in bad times.  
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H1: Bad times increase the value of analyst output 
The hypothesis assumes that analysts’ relative ability to analyze the macroeconomic environment and 
its effects increases relative to investors’ priors, which leads to an increased price-impact is bad times. 
Hope and Kang (2005) find analysts’ earnings forecasts to be less accurate in bad times, which 
predicts analyst output to have a smaller stock-price impact in bad times. However, Loh, and Stultz 
(2018) find that in bad times earnings forecasts are relatively more accurate controlling for the 
underlying volatility and that analyst revisions have a larger price-impact controlling for analyst, 
recommendation, and firm characteristics. Effectively, this is a joint-hypothesis of comparing analyst 
output value, investors’ dependency on the output, and the efficiency of the underlying institutions 
that constitute the price-discovery process (Hasbrouck (1995)). 
 
H2: Local analysts are better at analyzing the implications of bad times on local firms 
The hypothesis assumes that local analysts have an absolute advantage in covering Finnish companies 
compared to foreign peers in bad times. Bae, Stultz, and Tan (2007) find that local analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are more precise, which arises from their proximity to the covered firms and not due to 
analyst differences. However, the study does not examine how macroeconomic conditions affect the 
outcomes and whether changes in the scope of the macroeconomic conditions impact the result. Also, 
it is unclear whether local analysts have a relative advantage in covering Finnish companies, because 
local analysts have lower information costs yet might suffer from underwriter affiliation or other 
biases (e.g., Michaely & Womack, (1999)). This hypothesis tests both the value of the output as well 
as investors’ behavioral attitudes towards analysts from different locations. 
 
H3: Value of analyst output increases as the geographical scope of bad times narrows 
This hypothesis assumes that the value of both all analyst as well as local analyst output fluctuates in 
tandem with the geographical scope of bad times. More specifically, both effects are expected to 
shrink going from Finnish to European bad times. The implicit assumption is that economies, markets, 
and companies are interconnected yet different, and that analysts are the better at analyzing the 
implications the narrower the scope of the macroeconomic conditions. Past research finds both causal 
linkages and asymmetrical outcomes between countries and companies. For example, Chinn and 
Forbes (2004) find some evidence of cross-country factors that determine individual country’s stock 
market returns. Finland’s dependency on trade and relative proximity to Europe’s largest economies 
suggest a strong linkage between financial markets and thus it is unclear whether the effects exist. 
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H4: Investors’ reliance on analyst output increases in bad times 
The hypothesis explores one explanation why investors might value analyst output differently in bad 
times. The assumption is that investors’ relative need for analyst information increases in bad times 
and thus they value analyst output more in bad times. For example, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) find 
that investors with more private information rely less on analyst output and vice versa. I test this by 
comparing the price-impact for non-opaque and opaque stocks, for which there is less information 
available and for which investors require more information to assess at all times. I define stocks with 
low analyst coverage and small size as opaque. The hypothesis implicitly considers whether increased 
macro uncertainty raises the demand for information of the implications of bad times and if analysts 
are able to answer to the demand. An increased difference in the price-impact for opaque versus non-
opaque stocks indicates that investors’ reliance on analyst output increases in bad times.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Bad Times Measures 
I employ four proxies for bad macroeconomic times in 2006 to 2015. The proxies capture bad times 
in the financial markets, the real economy, and uncertainty regarding the present and future of the 
economy. I include macro bad times in the scope of Europe as well as Finland specifically. Timewise, 
political uncertainty is an ex-ante and recessions an ex-post proxy for effects in the financial markets 
and allows examination of changes in investors’ needs at different phases of economic cycles. As the 
first proxy I use the financial crisis; Credit Crisis equals the period from November 2007 to March 
2009. The second proxy, Recession Europe, equals NBER-defined recessions in Europe1, specifically 
the periods from March 2008 to June 2009 and June 2011 to March 2013.  
 
The third proxy, Recession Finland, uses the same definition in Finland2, which equals January 2008 
to June 2009 and December 2011 to March 2015. The fourth proxy is the Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
policy uncertainty index in Europe. High Uncertainty equals times when the Europe historical index3 
is in the top tercile of values between 2006 and 2015. Separately, Credit Crisis, Recession Europe, 
Recession Finland and High Uncertainty classify 14%, 32%, 48%, and 32% of the sample months as 
bad times, respectively. I define good times as non-bad times, following Loh and Stulz (2018). 
                                                          
1, 2 NBER-defined recessions are from the website: https://www.nber.org/ 
3 Data on the Economic Policy Uncertainty Monthly Index are from the website: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
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3.2. Stock Recommendations and Returns 
I obtain data from Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S International Detail file. Specifically, individual 
analyst recommendations for Nasdaq OMX Helsinki (OMXH) companies from 2006 to 2015. 
Following Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009), I define upgrades and downgrades by comparing 
an analyst’s current rating to a prior rating by the same analyst. Although I/B/E/S reports ratings on 
a scale of 1 (strong buy) to 5 (strong sell), I focus on recommendation revisions and not levels since 
prior research finds recommendation levels to be biased and less informative than rating changes 
(e.g., Boni and Womack (2006)). 
 
 Incorporating the methodology of Ljungqvist et al. (2009), I consider prior ratings to be outstanding 
if they have not been stopped according to the I/B/E/S Stopped file and are issued less than one year 
before the current recommendation. If a recommendation is issued after trading hours or on a non-
trading day, I move the recommendation date as the next trading day. I exclude anonymous analysts 
and recommendations with no outstanding prior rating from the same analyst, i.e. analyst initations 
and reinitations.  
 
I remove revisions that occur on firm-news days because I do not want the revisions to merely repeat 
the information of the firm-news releases. Although Loh and Stultz (2018) find that analysts 
piggyback less on firm-news days in bad economic times, I want to examine specifically the value of 
new information in analyst output. I define firm-news days as firms’ earnings announcement days. In 
addition, I remove recommendation changes which have occurred on days where multiple analysts 
have issued a recommendation for the same firm as in Loh and Stulz (2011), to remove the piggyback 
effect among analysts.  
 
Loh and Stulz (2018) note the concern that applying these filters to remove the piggyback effect can 
dismiss a larger amount of weaker-quality recommendations in bad times and thus give an upwardly 
biased sample on the value of the recommendations. However, as previously noted, analysts 
piggyback less in bad times. I retrieve return data of daily stock returns including net dividends of 
Nasdaq OMX Helsinki companies from January 2006 to December 2015 from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. I neglect companies with little or no analyst coverage, i.e. if there are no valid 
recommendation changes for the company during the sample period.  
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 presents annual figures of analyst recommendations for Nasdaq OMX Helsinki companies 
from 2006 to 2015. In total, the sample consists of 13123 recommendations and 7782 
recommendation changes. On average, 1312 recommendations are issued annually, and 
recommendation changes are distributed evenly between recommendation upgrades and downgrades. 
Further, local analyst recommendation changes comprise 72% of the total annual recommendation 
changes on average.  
 
Note the decreasing trend in the share of foreign analyst recommendations and total recommendations 
after the Financial Crisis in 2008. Local and foreign analyst recommendation changes are distributed 
similarly to upgrades and downgrades. Notice I do not consider absolute recommendation levels since 
absolute levels of recommendations can be biased and therefore recommendation changes are more 
reliable at assessing analyst impact (e.g., Boni and Womack (2006)). Assessing differences in the 
overall outlook on the stock-market for local and foreign analysts is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Analyst Recommendations from I/B/E/S International file, 2006 - 2015 
Table 1 reports annual observations of recommendations, divided into Upgrades and Downgrades, and their individual share of 
recommendation changes. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst's current rating minus their prior outstanding rating 
(initations and reinitations are excluded); changes made on earnings announcement days, and changes on multiple-recommendation 
days are excluded. Upgrades and downgrades are further divided by their issuer institution’s origin into Local Analyst Recs and 
Foreign Analyst Recs. Total Recs includes all recommendations issued during the period. Avg. presents simple arithmetic means for 
all columns. 
    
Upgrades 
  
Downgrades 
  
Local Analyst Recs 
  
Foreign Analyst Recs 
  
Total 
Recs Year   Obs of All   Obs of All   Up Down Total of All   Up Down Total of All   
2006   256 51%   245 49%   165 160 325 65%   91 85 176 35%   1317 
2007   454 51%   430 49%   297 271 568 64%   157 159 316 36%   1526 
2008   380 44%   483 56%   259 304 563 65%   121 179 300 35%   1503 
2009   428 51%   411 49%   307 290 597 71%   121 121 242 29%   1322 
2010   410 51%   398 49%   313 313 626 77%   97 85 182 23%   1376 
2011   487 52%   448 48%   356 339 695 74%   131 109 240 26%   1704 
2012   413 47%   458 53%   317 352 669 77%   96 106 202 23%   1234 
2013   333 45%   401 55%   271 312 583 79%   62 89 151 21%   1111 
2014   358 55%   289 45%   278 223 501 77%   80 66 146 23%   1006 
2015   337 48%   363 52%   241 249 490 70%   96 114 210 30%   1024 
Avg.   386 50%   393 50%   280 281 562 72%   105 111 217 28%   1312 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics on Analyst Recommendation Revisions from I/B/E/S International file, 2006 - 2015 
Table 2 reports the two-day CAR (in percentage), which is the average day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return following a 
recommendation change. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst's current rating minus their prior outstanding rating 
(initations and reinitations are excluded); changes made on company earnings announcement days, and changes on multiple-
recommendation days are excluded. The benchmark return for the CAR is the return from a 30-day trailing characteristics-matched 
DGTW portfolio in Europe. Bad times measures are as follows. Credit Crisis: November 2007 to March 2009 (The Financial Crisis). 
Recession EU: March 2008 to June 2009, June 2011 to March 2013 (NBER-defined recessions in Europe).  Recession Fin: January 
2008 to June 2009, December 2011 to March 2015 (NBER-defined recessions in Finland). High Uncertainty represents the highest 
tercile (over the period January 2006 to December 2015) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis policy uncertainty index in Europe. Good 
Times are non-bad times. LFR is the analyst's leader-follower ratio (calculated by dividing the time from the previous recommendation 
with the time to the next recommendation by another analyst). # Analysts is the number of analysts covering the firm, Size is the firm's 
market capitalization in thousands of euros and MB is the market-to-book ratio in the previous year from the recommendation. 
  
Credit Crisis   Recession EU   Recession Fin   High Uncertainty   Good Times 
Variable Mean Stdev Obs  Mean Stdev Obs  Mean Stdev Obs  Mean Stdev Obs  Mean Stdev Obs 
 Downgrade Sample 
CAR -0.56 0.06 1152  -0.50 0.05 3887  -0.38 0.05 5227  -0.17 0.05 3714  -0.22 0.03 2554 
LFR 4.0 10 1152  4.2 13 3887  4.9 14 5227  4.9 13 3714  4.1 11 2554 
# 
Analysts 
34 27 1152  34 27 3887  34 27 5227  35 27 3714  40 25 2554 
                   
Size 2885 4721 1152  2685 4664 3887  2798 5527 5227  3015 5810 3714  3030 5002 2554 
MB 2.4 1.6 1152  2.2 1.6 3887  2.5 16.9 5227  2.2 1.7 3714  2.8 2.5 2554 
  Upgrade Sample 
CAR 0.72 0.06 1810  0.59 0.05 3893  0.54 0.05 5233  0.60 0.05 3717  0.56 0.04 4893 
LFR 4.1 10 1810  4.6 11 3893  4.9 15 5233  4.9 14 3717  4.2 12 4893 
# 
Analysts 
34 27 1810  34 27 3893  34 27 5233  35 27 3717  42 26 4893 
                   
Size 2427 2 1810  2406 5650 3893  2837 5731 5233  2975 5810 3717  3033 6217 4893 
MB 2.3 1.8 1810   2.1 1.6 3893   2.5 16.9 5233   2.3 1.9 3717   2.8 2.6 4893 
 
Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation and number of observations for the variables CAR, 
LFR, # Analysts, Size and MB in different economic times, divided into Upgrade and Downgrade 
Samples. CAR represents the average two-day cumulative abnormal return against a 30-day trailing 
characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio following a recommendation change. In both samples the 
sign of the average CAR follows the direction of the recommendation change, positive for upgrades 
and negative for downgrades. In both samples the largest average CAR occurs during the Credit 
Crisis, followed by Recession EU in downgrades, which implies that investors are less familiar with 
the implications of bad times at the European scope and therefore value analyst output more in those 
times.  
 
In the Upgrade Sample the second largest effect occurs during High Uncertainty, which could be due 
to investors valuing and liking positive sings and not wanting to drop out during uncertain times. LFR 
is calculated by dividing the time from the previous recommendation with the time to the following 
recommendation. A ratio of over one represents a leader analyst since other analysts react quickly to 
Desperate Times Call for Valuable Measures: Impact of Macro Conditions on Value of Analyst Output in Finland 
12 
their recommendations. The average LFR has slightly increased from the Credit Crisis in other bad 
times measures. # Analysts presents the number of analyst covering each firm, which is on average 
over five analysts larger per firm in good times, in line with findings of Merkley et al. (2017). Size 
and MB present the market capitalization in thousands of euros and the market-to-book-ratio for each 
firm. MBs and Sizes are larger in good times due to higher valuation levels, as is expected. 
 
3.4. Methods 
To study if recommendation changes yield higher abnormal returns in bad times, I conduct an event-
study by adopting a 30-day estimation period and a two-trading event window following Loh and 
Stulz (2018). Specifically, I compute a two-day Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) from 
the recommendation date to the following trading day, as in during the [0,1] event window for both 
upgrades and downgrades. As the benchmark return, I use the return from a characteristics-matched 
DGTW portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)), formally stated as: 
Ri,t  - Rft = α + βi1 SMBt + βi2 HMLt + βi3 MOMt + εi,t                                    (1) 
where Ri,t  - Rft is the return on stock i over the risk-free rate Rft during time t. SMB is the size-, HML 
is the value-, and MOM is the momentum-factor, all daily returns on the factor-portfolios in Europe42. 
βi1, βi2, and βi3 are stock i’s coefficients to the factors from the preceding 30 days. α is the intercept 
of the model and εi,t is the error term. Next, I calculate the Abnormal Return separately for upgrades 
and downgrades on a single trading day t within the event-window as the return on stock i less the 
return on a characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio: 
 ARi,t = Ri,t – Rft – βi1 SMBt – βi2 HMLt – βi3 MOMt                                         (2) 
To calculate the Average Abnormal Return for all codirectional recommendation changes N on 
trading day t within the event-window: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅t =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖=1 i,t                                                            (3) 
The Cumulative Average Abnormal Return over the event window [0,1] is the sum of all Average 
Abnormal Returns ranging from day 0 to day 1: 
     CAAR0,1 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅
0,1
𝑡=0 t                                                           (4) 
                                                          
4 Daily returns for SMB, HML, MOM factors in Europe are from the website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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To test the robustness of the results, I incorporate both the CAPM and the Carhart Four-Factor Model 
as benchmarks. To calculate the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return, I first calculate the Abnormal 
Returns with both models and continue as with the DGTW portfolio. Starting with the CAPM: 
ARi,t = Ri,t – Rft – βi1 (Rmt – Rft)                                                          (5) 
where βi1 is stock i’s coefficient with the OMX Helsinki Index over the risk-free rate (Rmt - Rft). 
Using the Four-Factor Model, developed by Carhart (1997) to calculate the Abnormal Return: 
ARi,t = Ri,t – Rft – βi1 (Rmt – Rft) – βi2 SMBt – βi3 HMLt – βi4 MOMt                             (6) 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Price-Impact of Recommendation Changes 
Table 3 presents the average two-day CAR in percentages divided by their time of occurrence into 
Credit Crisis, High Uncertainty, Recession Europe, and Recession Finland, and further into 
downgrades and upgrades. Statistical significance is reported and based on standard errors clustered 
by calendar day. Both downgrades and upgrades have a larger impact during bad times. However, the 
difference to the effect in good times is statistically significant at the 5% level only during the Credit 
Crisis, as the average two-day CAR for a recommendation downgrade is -0.727% versus -0.294% in 
good times. Also, downgrades during Recession Europe result in an average CAR of -0.512% versus 
-0.294%, indicating a statistically significant difference at the 10% level.  
 
The average CAR in bad times compared good times being statistically insignificant indicates that 
analyst output is mostly not more valuable in bad times, although the effect is larger in bad times in 
all but downgrades during High Uncertainty. The average CAR for both upgrades and downgrades 
during good and bad times is mostly statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that 
analysts do have an impact on market prices in both good and bad times. The findings are in conflict 
with Loh and Stulz (2018), who report statistically significant differences between good and bad 
times in the US for all bad time measures and for upgrades and downgrades at the 1% level.  
 
The difference can be caused by differences in the sample, markets, analysts and their output as well 
as investor behavior. Their sample starts over 10 years before the one I use and includes the crisis of 
October 1987 and Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 1998. However, insignificant 
results during recessions and high uncertainty, which I define by using the same criteria, indicate that 
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the differences do not solely arise from time difference in the samples. Also, I replicate the methods 
as closely as possible. Therefore, the results suggest that the difference in the price-impact for various 
economic times in the US and Finland arise from difference in how investors value analyst output or 
in the quality of the output itself. Section 4.3. studies change in investors’ reliance on analyst output. 
Another cause for the difference can be the benchmark and it being more accurate in Finland for the 
stocks the recommendation changes consider. Section 5.1. introduces additional benchmarks. 
 
Table 3 
Recommendation Change Impact in Bad Times 
Table 3 reports the two-day CAR (in percentage), which is the average day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return following 
a recommendation change. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst's current rating minus their prior 
outstanding rating (initations and reinitations are excluded); changes made on company earnings announcement days, 
and changes on multiple-recommendation days are excluded. The benchmark return for the CAR is the return from a 30-
day trailing characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio in Europe. Bad times measures are as follows. Credit Crisis: 
November 2007 to March 2009 (The Financial Crisis). Recession Europe: March 2008 to June 2009, June 2011 to March 
2013 (NBER-defined recessions in Europe).  Recession Finland: January 2008 to June 2009, December 2011 to March 
2015 (NBER-defined recessions in Finland). High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the period January 
2006 to December 2015) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2018) policy uncertainty index in Europe. Good Times are 
non-bad times. T-statistics are in absolute levels and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Bad Times 
Measure 
      Two-Day CAR (%) 
  Rec-Change   Variable   Bad Times Good Times Difference 
Credit Crisis Downgrade   Percent   -0.727 -0.294 -0.433 
        t-stat   (4.22)*** (2.55)** (2.09)** 
        Obs   576 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.542 0.453 0.089 
        t-stat   (2.84)*** (4.11)*** (0.40) 
        Obs   469 1398   
High 
Uncertainty 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.235 -0.294 0.059 
      t-stat   (1.97)** (2.55)** (0.36) 
        Obs   1196 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.569 0.453 0.116 
        t-stat   (4.63)*** (4.11)*** (0.70) 
        Obs   1126 1398   
Recession 
Europe 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.512 -0.294 -0.218 
      t-stat   (4.51)*** (2.55)** (1.35) 
        Obs   1316 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.592 0.453 0.139 
        t-stat   (4.76)*** (4.11)*** (0.84) 
        Obs   1097 1398   
Recession 
Finland 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.407 -0.294 -0.113 
      t-stat   (4.19)*** (2.55)** (0.75) 
        Obs   1807 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.538 0.453 0.085 
        t-stat   (5.15)*** (4.11)*** (0.56) 
        Obs   1557 1398   
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4.2. Local versus Foreign Analyst Comparison 
Table 4 
Local versus Foreign Analyst Recommendation Change Comparison 
Table 4 reports the two-day CAR (in percentage), which is the average day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return following 
a recommendation change for Local Analysts and Foreign Analysts. A recommendation change is defined as the 
analyst's current rating minus their prior outstanding rating (initations and reinitations are excluded); changes made on 
company earnings announcement days, and changes on multiple-recommendation days are excluded. Recommendations 
are divided into local and foreign based on their issuer institution’s origin. The benchmark return for the CAR is the 
return from a 30-day trailing characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio in Europe. Bad times measures are as follows. 
Credit Crisis: November 2007 to March 2009 (The Financial Crisis). Recession EU: March 2008 to June 2009, June 
2011 to March 2013 (NBER-defined recessions in Europe).  Recession Fin: January 2008 to June 2009, December 2011 
to March 2015 (NBER-defined recessions in Finland). High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the period 
January 2006 to December 2015) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2018) policy uncertainty index in Europe. Good 
Times are non-bad times. T-statistics are in absolute levels and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Time 
Measure 
    Two-Day CAR (%) 
  Rec-Change   Variable   Local Analyst Foreign Analyst Difference 
Credit Crisis  Downgrade  Percent  -0.763 -0.663 -0.100 
    t-stat  (3.55)*** (2.30)** (0.39) 
    Obs  369 207  
  Upgrade  Percent  0.846 -0.038 0.883 
    t-stat  (3.60)*** (0.12) (2.20)** 
    Obs  308 161  
         
High 
Uncertainty 
 Downgrade  Percent  -0.085 -0.662 0.576 
   t-stat  (0.62) (2.82)*** (2.92)*** 
  
  Obs  886 310 
 
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.588 0.509 0.079 
  
  t-stat  (4.16)*** (2.05)** (0.28) 
  
  Obs  849 277 
 
         
Recession 
Europe 
 Downgrade  Percent  -0.465 -0.630 0.164 
   t-stat  (3.46)*** (2.95)*** (0.85) 
  
  Obs  941 375 
 
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.642 0.461 0.181 
    t-stat  (4.39)*** (1.94)* (0.65) 
    Obs  796 301 
 
         
Recession 
Finland 
 Downgrade  Percent  -0.393 -0.442 0.049 
   t-stat  (3.45)*** (2.39)** (0.27) 
  
  Obs  1308 499 
 
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.650 0.204 0.445 
    t-stat  (5.38)*** (0.98) (1.84)* 
    Obs  1167 390 
 
         
Good Time  Downgrade 
 Percent  0.004 -0.314 0.318 
  
  t-stat  (0.03) (1.55) (1.60) 
  
  Obs  864 413  
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.161 0.468 -0.307 
    t-stat  (1.22) (2.36)** (1.29) 
        Obs   965 433   
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Table 4 presents the average two-day CAR in percentages for both local and foreign analyst 
recommendation changes divided into Credit Crisis, High Uncertainty, Recession Europe, Recession 
Finland, and Good Times. Statistical significance is reported and based on standard errors clustered 
by calendar day. There is some evidence for local analysts being more informative in Finnish bad 
times and the difference evening out as the scope widens to European bad times. For the average 
CAR following upgrades, the difference between local and foreign analysts during Recession Finland 
is 0.445% and drops to 0.181% during Recession Europe. Upgrades issued by local analysts during 
Credit Crisis result in an average CAR of 0.846% compared to -0.038% for foreign analysts, resulting 
in a difference of 0.883%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Further, the results indicate 
that local analysts are more informative in upgrades and foreign peers in downgrades. 
 
Note the difference is significant at the 1% level for downgrades during High Uncertainty, although 
it is foreign analyst output which has the larger price-impact by 0.576%. Contradictory to the results, 
Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) find significant local analyst advantage especially in countries where 
earnings are smoothed, firms disclose less information and idiosyncratic risk explains a small fraction 
of stock returns. Thus, the indifference in the price-impact for local and foreign analysts in bad times 
can arise from similar firm fixed-effects, for which Section 5.2. adds controls. In addition, investor 
and analyst differences discovered in Section 4.1. can dilute the location-induced effects. 
                               
4.3. Opaque versus Non-Opaque Stock Comparison 
Table 5 presents the average two-day CAR in percentages for recommendation changes on opaque 
and non-opaque stocks divided into Credit Crisis, High Uncertainty, Recession Europe, Recession 
Finland, and Good Times. Statistical significance is reported and based on standard errors clustered 
by calendar day. I find weak evidence for the price-impact being larger on opaque stocks and thus 
investors’ reliance on analyst output increasing in bad times. The difference in the average CAR for 
opaque stocks is insignificant for all time measures and recommendation changes.  
 
Note the small amount of observations of recommendation changes on opaque stocks, which I define 
as stocks ranking in the bottom half in both number of analysts covering the stock and market 
capitalization. The cause of the low amount of observations is that large and active analyst institutions 
do not cover the smallest stocks, leading to less recommendations qualifying as changes. The small 
amount of observations leads to recommendation changes on those stocks having a statistically 
insignificant impact on the two-day CAR, despite significant price-impacts percentage-wise. 
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Table 5 
Opaque versus Non-Opaque Stock Recommendation Change Comparison 
Table 5 reports the two-day CAR (in percentage), which is the average day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return following a 
recommendation change for Opaque and Non-Opaque stocks. Opaque stocks are stocks listed on OMX Helsinki that rank 
in the bottom half in both number of analyst covering the stock and last year's market capitalization. A recommendation 
change is defined as the analyst's current rating minus their prior outstanding rating (initations and reinitations are 
excluded); changes made on company earnings announcement days, and changes on multiple-recommendation days are 
excluded. The benchmark return for the CAR is the return from a 30-day trailing characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio 
in Europe. Bad times measures are as follows. Credit Crisis: November 2007 to March 2009 (The Financial Crisis). 
Recession Europe: March 2008 to June 2009, June 2011 to March 2013 (NBER-defined recessions in Europe).  Recession 
Finland: January 2008 to June 2009, December 2011 to March 2015 (NBER-defined recessions in Finland). High 
Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the period January 2006 to December 2015) of the Baker, Bloom, and 
Davis (2018) policy uncertainty index in Europe. Good Times are non-bad times. T-statistics are in absolute levels and 
based on standard errors clustered by calendar day. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
Time 
Measures 
    Two-Day CAR (%) 
  Rec-Change   Variable   Opaque Non-Opaque Difference 
Crisis  Downgrade  Percent  0.432 -0.793 -1.224 
    t-stat  (0.58) (4.48)*** (1.40) 
    Obs  31 545  
  Upgrade  Percent  0.697 0.537 0.160 
    t-stat  (0.64) (2.77)*** (0.13) 
    Obs  15 454  
         
High 
Uncertainty 
 Downgrade  Percent  -0.471 -0.228 -0.244 
   t-stat  (0.67) (1.88)* (0.29) 
  
  Obs  35 1161 
 
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.650 0.566 0.084 
  
  t-stat  (0.97) (4.53)*** (0.10) 
  
  Obs  38 1088 
 
         
Recession 
Europe 
 Downgrade  Percent  -0.372 -0.518 0.145 
   t-stat  (0.64) (4.46)*** (0.20) 
  
  Obs  51 1265 
 
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.483 0.597 -0.115 
    t-stat  (0.79) (4.69)*** (0.15) 
    Obs  46 1051 
 
         
Recession 
Finland 
 Downgrade  Percent  -0.349 -0.409 0.059 
   t-stat  (0.69) (4.13)*** (0.09) 
  
  Obs  67 1740 
 
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.263 0.549 -0.286 
    t-stat  (0.48) (5.15)*** (0.39) 
    Obs  57 1500 
 
         
Good Time  Downgrade 
 Percent  0.004 -0.314 0.318 
  
  t-stat  (0.01) (2.63)*** (0.49) 
  
  Obs  82 1195  
  Upgrade 
 Percent  0.161 0.468 -0.307 
    t-stat  (0.33) (4.14)*** (0.44) 
        Obs   70 1328   
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5. Robustness Tests 
5.1. The CAPM and 4F Model as Benchmarks 
Table 6 
Recommendation Change Impact in Bad Times 
Table 6 reports the two-day CAR (in percentage), which is the average day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return following a 
recommendation change. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst's current rating minus their prior outstanding 
rating (initations and reinitations are excluded); changes made on company earnings announcement days, and changes on 
multiple-recommendation days are excluded.  Bad times measures are as follows. Credit Crisis: November 2007 to March 
2009 (The Financial Crisis). Recession EU: March 2008 to June 2009, June 2011 to March 2013 (NBER-defined 
recessions in Europe).  Recession Fin: January 2008 to June 2009, December 2011 to March 2015 (NBER-defined 
recessions in Finland). High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the period January 2006 to December 2015) 
of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2018) policy uncertainty index in Europe. Good Times are non-bad times. In Panel A 
the benchmark return is a 30-day trailing beta-adjusted return of OMX Helsinki Total Return Index, which includes net 
dividends. In Panel B the benchmark return is from a 30-day trailing characteristics-matched Carhart Four-Factor Model. 
T-statistics are in absolute levels and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: CAPM Benchmark 
Bad Times 
Measure 
      Two-Day CAR (%) 
  Rec-Change   Variable   Bad Times Good Times Difference 
Credit Crisis   Downgrade   Percent   -0.385 1.018 -1.403 
        t-stat   (2.45)** (9.65)*** (7.40)*** 
        Obs   576 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.767 1.686 -0.919 
        t-stat   (4.40)*** (16.73)*** (4.56)*** 
        Obs   469 1398   
                  
High 
Uncertainty 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.340 1.018 -1.358 
      t-stat   (3.12)*** (9.65)*** (8.95)*** 
        Obs   1196 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.471 1.686 -1.215 
        t-stat   (4.20)*** (16.73)*** (8.05)*** 
        Obs   1126 1398   
                  
Recession 
Europe 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.413 1.018 -1.431 
      t-stat   (3.97)*** (9.65)*** (9.66)*** 
        Obs   1316 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.574 1.686 -1.112 
        t-stat   (5.04)*** (16.73)*** (7.31)*** 
        Obs   1097 1398   
                  
Recession 
Finland 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.301 1.018 -1.319 
      t-stat   (3.40)*** (9.65)*** (9.57)*** 
        Obs   1807 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.612 1.686 -1.074 
        t-stat   (6.41)*** (16.73)*** (7.73)*** 
        Obs   1557 1398   
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Panel B: 4F Model Benchmark 
Bad Times 
Measure 
      Two-Day CAR (%) 
  Rec-Change Variable   Bad Times Good Times Difference 
Credit Crisis   Downgrade   Percent   -0.564 -0.220 -0.344 
        t-stat   (3.06)*** (1.78)* (1.55) 
        Obs   576 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.716 0.558 0.158 
        t-stat   (3.51)*** (4.73)*** (0.67) 
        Obs   469 1398   
                  
High 
Uncertainty 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.169 -0.220 0.051 
      t-stat   (1.33) (1.78) * (0.29) 
        Obs   1196 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.599 0.558 0.041 
        t-stat   (4.56)*** (4.73)*** (0.23) 
        Obs   1126 1398   
                  
Recession 
Europe 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.505 -0.220 -0.285 
      t-stat   (4.15)*** (1.78)* (1.65)* 
        Obs   1316 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.586 0.558 0.028 
        t-stat   (4.40)*** (4.73)*** (0.16) 
        Obs   1097 1398   
                  
Recession 
Finland 
  Downgrade   Percent   -0.389 -0.220 -0.169 
      t-stat   (3.75)*** (1.78)* (1.05) 
        Obs   1807 1277   
    Upgrade   Percent   0.542 0.558 -0.016 
        t-stat   (4.85)*** (4.73)*** (0.10) 
        Obs   1557 1398   
 
Table 6 presents the average two-day CAR in percentages for recommendation changes divided into 
Credit Crisis, High Uncertainty, Recession Europe, and Recession Finland. Statistical significance is 
reported and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day. Panel A presents the results with the 
CAPM and Panel B with the Carhart Four-Factor Model as benchmarks. I find strong evidence for 
analyst output being more valuable in bad times using the CAPM model, consistent with the results 
of Loh and Stulz (2018). The results are statistically significant at the 1% level for all bad times and 
both upgrades and downgrades. Note the effect is lesser in bad times for both recommendation types. 
  
The results from using the Carhart Four-Factor Model are similar to the results using the DGTW 
portfolio as a benchmark, presented in Section 4.1. I find weak evidence for additional value in bad 
times, as only downgrades during Recession Europe yield a statistically significant difference at the 
10% level. The varied results for different models suggest that the difference between the US and 
Finland could be explained by difference in the markets and models’ varying ability to describe them. 
Desperate Times Call for Valuable Measures: Impact of Macro Conditions on Value of Analyst Output in Finland 
20 
5.2. Effects of Analyst, Recommendation and Firm Characteristics 
Table 7 
Panel Regression of Recommendation Change CARs in Bad Times 
Table 7 reports the effect of bad times on recommendation two-day CARs (in percentage), which is the average day 
[0,1] cumulative abnormal return following a recommendation change controlling for firm, analyst, and 
recommendation characteristics. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst's current rating minus their prior 
outstanding rating (initations and reinitations are excluded); changes made on company earnings announcement days, 
and changes on multiple-recommendation days are excluded. The benchmark return for the CAR is the return from a 
30-day trailing characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio in Europe. Control variables are as follows. LFR is the 
analyst’s prior-year leader-follower ratio, # Analysts is the number of analysts covering the firm, Size is the firm’s 
market capitalization in the prior year, BM is the book-to-market ratio. Bad times measures are as follows. Credit Crisis: 
November 2007 to March 2009 (The Financial Crisis). Recession Europe: March 2008 to June 2009, June 2011 to March 
2013 (NBER-defined recessions in Europe).  Recession Finland: January 2008 to June 2009, December 2011 to March 
2015 (NBER-defined recessions in Finland). High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the period January 
2006 to December 2015) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2018) policy uncertainty index in Europe. Good Times are 
non-bad times. Panel A presents the results with the CAR of Downgrades and Panel B the CAR of Upgrades as the 
dependent variables. T-statistics are in absolute levels and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: CAR of Downgrades 
Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit Crisis  -0.433 -1.006       
  (2.09)** (5.70)***       
High Uncertainty 
  
 0.059 -8.143 
    
  
 (0.36) (0.58) 
    
Recession Europe 
   
 
 -0.218 -7.259   
   
 
 (1.35) (1.39)   
Recession Finland   
     -0.113 -5.627 
  
     (0.75) (4.25)*** 
LFR   -7.583 
 2.214  -4.213 
 -2.793 
  
 (0.13) 
 (1.55)  (0.07) 
 (0.01) 
Location   2.684 
 2.214  2.108  2.164 
  
 (1.88)*  (1.55)  (1.48)  (1.52) 
Log # Analysts   -6.506  -6.991  -5.637  -6.164 
 
  (1.15)  (1.23)  (1.00)  (1.09) 
Log Size   9.346  1.018  1.013  1.066 
  
 (2.45)**  (2.66)***  (2.65)***  (2.79)*** 
Log BM  
 2.205  2.364  1.455  1.850 
  
 (2.49)**  (2.65)***  (1.61)  (2.06)** 
Intercept  -0.294 -4.893 -0.294 -6.633 -0.294 -4.168 -0.294 -4.459 
  (2.55)** (1.64) (2.55)** (2.21)** (2.55)** (1.39) (2.55)** (1.48) 
Adj. R2  0.0024 0.0137 0.0011 0.0047 0.0051 0.0121 0.0044 0.0097 
Industry F.E.   No Yes No  Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Panel B: Dependent Variable: CAR of Upgrades 
Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit Crisis  0.089 -1.850       
  (0.40) (0.96)       
High Uncertainty 
  
 0.116 -2.336 
    
  
 (0.70) (1.62) 
    
Recession Europe 
   
 
 0.139 -1.019   
   
 
 (0.84) (0.70)   
Recession Finland   
     0.085 -3.124 
  
     (0.56) (2.31)** 
LFR   -1.146 
 -1.114  -1.127 
 -1.070 
  
 (2.17)** 
 (2.11)**  (2.13)** 
 (2.02)** 
Location   2.588 
 2.497  2.567  2.454 
  
 (1.77)*  (1.71)*  (1.76)*  (1.68)* 
Log # Analysts   5.170  5.130  4.984  5.589 
 
  (0.90)  (0.90)  (0.87)  (0.98) 
Log Size   -5.270  -5.048  -5.176  -4.993 
  
 (1.39)  (1.34)  (1.37)  (1.32) 
Log BM  
 5.691  4.234  4.488  2.695 
  
 (0.63)  (0.47)  (0.49)  (0.30) 
Intercept  0.453 9.460 0.453 9.887 0.453 9.588 0.453 1.041 
  (4.11)*** (3.20)*** (4.11)*** (3.33)*** (4.11)*** (3.20)*** (4.11)*** (3.49)*** 
Adj. R2  0.0000 0.0014 0.0017 0.0020 0.0011 0.0014 0.0021 0.0027 
Industry F.E.   No Yes No  Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Table 7 reports estimates of OLS panel regressions in which I control for firm, analyst, and 
recommendation characteristics to ensure the robustness of the results and that it is the bad times that 
drive the results. For all bad times measures and both upgrade and downgrades, I first estimate the 
CAR using a constant and a bad times indicator. The intercept is the CAR impact of good times and 
the coefficient on the bad times indicator is the additional impact of recommendation changes in bad 
times, which equal the CAR differences in Table 3. I cluster standard errors by calendar day to 
account for cross-sectional correlation of returns on the same day, following Loh and Stulz (2018). 
 
For analyst and recommendation fixed-effects, I control for analyst influence and location. First, I 
use the analyst leader-follower ratio, LFR, which indicates a greater stock-price impact for leader 
analysts following Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001). I calculate the LFR on a company basis for each 
analyst in the previous year by dividing the time from the previous recommendation with the time to 
the next recommendation and use the highest outstanding ratio for each analyst. A ratio over one 
indicates a leader analyst, since other analysts issue new recommendations more quickly after the 
leader’s recommendation. Second, I use the location of the analyst’s institution, as in local or foreign. 
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For firm fixed-effects, I control for the number of analysts covering each firm, # Analysts, as increases 
in the number of financial analysts improve information quality and efficiency of information 
distribution (e.g., Merkley, Michaely, Pacelli (2017)). Further, the number of analysts varies 
significantly over time, and is related to e.g., market returns, trading volume, and IPO activity, all of 
which are negatively affected in bad macroeconomic times. As other controls, I use firms’ market 
capitalization from the previous year, Size, and book-to-market ratio BM, following Loh and Stultz 
(2018). I take logs for the firm fixed-effects to account for extreme values. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics on all of the control variables. In general, the characteristics look similar through 
good and bad times. Approximately, CAR and LFR increase and # Analysts, Size, and MB decrease 
in bad times. 
 
I find weak evidence for bad times increasing the value of analyst output when including control 
variables for firm, analyst, and recommendation fixed-effects. In the downgrade sample, most of the 
coefficients on bad times measures are statistically insignificant. The exceptions are both measures 
in Credit Crisis and for Recession Finland when controlling for fixed-effects, which indicate that the 
bad times component does have a statistically significant effect on the price-impact during bad times. 
Thus, for downgrades, consistency with the findings of Loh and Stulz (2018) seems to appear in times 
of bad times in financial markets and during recession at the Finnish scope, consistent with analysts 
being better at analyzing the implications of local bad times. 
 
For upgrades, I find similarly weak evidence for the value of analyst output increasing in bad times. 
Only the coefficient on Recession Finland when controlling for firm, analyst, and recommendation 
fixed effects. Thus, the effect of bad times is statistically significant for both upgrades and 
downgrades during Recession Finland, when controlling for fixed-effects. The intercepts for all time 
measures are all statistically significant at the 1%, indicating that other factors than what is included 
explain the results.  
 
The results are mixed between the upgrade and downgrade samples for the control variables. For 
downgrades, market capitalization, Size, has a statistically significant effect for all bad times 
measures. Also, the book-to-market-ratio, BM, has a significant effect for all bad times measures 
expect Recession Europe. For upgrades, the analyst leader-follower-ratio, LFR, and Location of the 
analyst have significant effects for all bad times measures, implying that investors in Finland trust 
local and leader analysts for good news. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper I assemble a data sample of analyst recommendations from 2006 to 2015 of OMX 
Helsinki companies to examine whether macro conditions affect the value of analyst output in 
Finland. I incorporate multiple proxies for bad macroeconomic times and use the price-impact 
following analyst recommendation changes as the indicator for value. Throughout the paper I assume 
that analyst behavior is fixed and the perceived value-effect occurs because of investors value analyst 
output differently. 
 
I test four hypotheses and the results are as follows. First, I find weak evidence for analyst output 
being more valuable in bad times in Finland, inconsistent with the findings of Loh and Stulz (2018) 
in the US. Second, I find suspect evidence for local analysts being more informative than foreign 
peers. Third, I find weak evidence for a location-induced difference among analyst recommendations 
evening out as the scope of the bad times widens. Fourth, I am unable to credit increases in investors’ 
reliance on analyst output for differences in analyst output value. Finally, using the CAPM as the 
return benchmark, I find strong evidence for analyst output being more valuable in bad times. 
 
For future research, I would focus on examining why the effect of bad times on output value and for 
output in general is more pronounced in the US compared to Finland. First, I would examine whether 
analysts change their behavior in bad times. Second, I would study how various benchmarks models 
perform in both markets for the stocks that receive recommendations. Third, I would incorporate a 
more comprehensive model of investors’ sources of information over economic times.  
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